Tragic U.S. Policies in Iraq and Afghanistan

Alternative Insight

The Tragic U.S. Policies in Iraq and Afghanistan
True to Form

United States policy makers never learn. Whenever the United States commits troops to achieve a policy, the policy eventually fails and darkens the landscape.The policies in Iraq and Afghanistan continue towards similar and predictable conclusions. However, this time the conclusions seem more ominous.

By considering the results of past military adventures, President Obama can make reliable decisions on troop efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. president can explain to the American public that the tragic consequences of military adventures of the past portend a future that contains similar military interventions. By embarking on new policy directions that improve U.S. relations with uncomfortable nations, the U.S. war against terrorism and Radical Islam will bring more positive results.

U.S. counterproductive policies follow a pattern:

(1) A made-up story which disguises true U.S. intentions towards its adversary.
(2) A feeble attempt at negotiations in which the adversary is given an offer it must refuse.
(3) Invasion by U.S. troops.
(4) Gradual buildup of troops and more massive buildup as resistance increases.
(5) Eventual unsustainable losses with no progress
(6) Efforts to conciliate.
(7) Troop withdrawal.
(8) A civil war in the attacked nation.
(9) Either the original antagonists reestablishes itself or a regime more antagonistic to the U.S. emerges.

A brief look at the history of U.S. foreign policy strategies where the U.S. committed troops to achieve its objectives.

Vietnam (1962-1975)
The Kennedy and Johnson administrations' stated objective for their Vietnam policy included prevention of a Communist takeover of Vietnam, which could lead neighboring states (domino theory) to the Communist sphere of influence. This public declaration disguised more obvious objectives; the prevention of a scheduled election in Vietnam and preservation of U.S. hegemony in Southeast Asia. After the National Liberation Front (NLF), its ranks reinforced by those antagonistic to U.S. military presence, launched a 1968 attack in Saigon (Tet offensive), the U.S. government would not sustain more losses and, with fits and starts, gradually retreated. The Communist North established itself throughout Vietnam. Neighboring nations of Laos and Cambodia suffered civil wars, but the domino theory never materialized.

Lebanon (1983)
Ronald Reagan sent U.S. marines to the beaches of Lebanon as part of an international peacekeeping mission for preserving Lebanese sovereignty during an Israeli invasion. The U.S. military intervention, and the firing of missiles at Lebanese populations the U.S. had come to protect, resulted in reprisals that destroyed the U.S. embassy and a marine barracks. Since the U.S. intervention did nothing to protect Lebanon's sovereignty, why did U.S. forces enter Lebanon? Although U.S. objectives were unclear, undoubtedly the intervention intended to make certain that any new government arising from the turmoil coincided with U.S. interests. Radical Lebanese factions considered U.S. troops favoring the Maronite Catholics in dominating Lebanon. Result: A U.S. retreat followed by a decade of civil war. Today, most of Lebanon's political forces are anti-American and Hezbollah, America's most ardent antagonist, has reinforced strength in the present Lebanese government.

Somalia (1993)
President Clinton characterized the 1993 U.S. military mission in Somalia as a humanitarian effort; bringing food to a starving Somalia. However, wherever U.S. troops moved, the famine had already ceased. Instead, U.S. marines and UN forces began house to house searches for weapons maintained by Somalia factions and disclosed the actual reason for the 'humanitarian' intervention; steer the power to factions most amenable to U.S. dictates. When UN troops attempted to close the radio station commanded by Mohammed Farah Aideed, a former Somali ambassador who had been elected chairman of the United Somali Congress by a 2/3 vote, Somali militiamen killed 24 Pakistani troops. The action propelled the U.S. forces into a five-month manhunt for Aideed. The marines engaged in several "shoot outs" with Somali, including the killing of two children who had climbed into marine vehicles and reached for their sunglasses. After 18 U.S. soldiers were killed and their corpses dragged through the Mogadishu streets, the U.S. military left Somalia.

The U.S. antagonism towards Mohammed Farah Aideed, a nationalist who did not support Al Qaeda and could have pacified Somalia, eventually placed the nation in the arms of Taliban look-alike, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). A combination of Ethiopian military and warlord forces defeated the ICU and replaced it with a new government. ICU irregulars in Somalia continue the fight.

Which brings us to Iraq and Afghanistan

Iraq (2003-2009)
The reason for the U.S. invasion of Iraq - halting Saddam Hussein's development of nuclear weapons - has been discredited. Another reason, the bringing democracy to Iraq as a prelude to democratizing and stabilizing the Middle East, has proved fruitless. The more likely objective was to subdue the Middle East nation that had the potential to become the focus of Middle East power.

The overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime and election of an Iraqi parliament can be perceived as positive elements, but at what price? The negative results of the debacle are well known - insurgency against U.S. forces, civil strife, creation of one to two million Iraq refugees. More directly counter to U.S. policy objectives have been the entrance into Iraq of Radical Islamic extremists, the potential breakup of Iraq, the increase in the Shia/Sunni divide, and the increase of Iranian power in the Middle East.

Even if U.S. military forces remain to assist the Iraqi Shia government in its battles with Islamic insurgents, in dampening civil strife and preventing Kurdish independence, the day U.S. forces finally leave conflicts will break out again.

Afghanistan (2001-2009)
Intending to destroy Al Qaeda, the U.S. attack on Afghanistan, which was supported by NATO, has only succeeded in displacing Al Qaeda and much of the Taliban to Pakistan. The principal accomplishment of the U.S. intervention has been to return Afghanistan to the immediate post-years of the Soviet defeat. The popularity of Hamid Karzai's 2009 government is comparable to that of the 1992 Mohammad Najibullah government. While a corrupt national government maintains itself in Kabul, a reinvigorated Taliban rules portions of Afghanistan and tribal warlords rule other provinces of the nation. These tribal warlords wait to collect additional spoils and the Taliban waits to defeat the warlords and impose its ultra-extreme religious philosophy. Taking a page from the NLF in its Tet offensive, the Talban has demonstrated the scope of its presence by already managing to attack the center of Afghanistan government power in Kabul.

U.S. military presence has spawned a more hard-line Taliban. Younger Taliban have allied themselves with foreign militants in the tribal areas who speak of a fundamentalist Islamic emirate that will encompass the Muslim world. Another consequence of the Bush administration's intervention has been the widening of the conflict into Pakistan, already a highly troubled and unstable nuclear state.

The Future
Once again, heard in the land are the phrases: "Insurgencies cannot be defeated without protecting and winning over the general population," "We have a whole range of options," and "Transform Iraq and it will impact the whole Arab-Muslim world." These phrases are similar to the "Winning hearts and minds of the local population," "Sending good money to replace bad money," and a "Reverse of the Domino Theory" of past interventions. The truth is that previous conflicts show a military solution is not possible, and the situation only becomes worse as the troops remain. More foreign troops translate into more native insurgents. More killing of insurgents translates into more sympathy for the insurgency. Analysis indicates the insurgency cannot end until the entire nation is decimated and most of its population killed. President Obama should base his policies on the realities of the past and relate those realities with facts and authority to the American people. Otherwise, American lives will be sacrificed in futile efforts.

A 'no-win' situation' results in a losing situation, or more of a chance of lowering the losses. Iraq will undoubtedly resolve its usual civil strife by its usual means, with a military leader taking charge and guiding the country.

Troop withdrawal will create problems but troops will not resolve the issues in an Afghanistan that has returned to a situation which resembles the the last days of the Soviet presence. Afghanistan is prepared to once again witness strife between warlords and the central administration followed by conflict between the Taliban and the warlords. However, if NATO leaves Afghanistan, pressure will be relieved on Pakistan as Taliban fighters return to their homeland. Al Qaeda will not benefit from the lack of U.S. military presence. Surveillance drones, together with information from tribal leaders friendly to the western powers, have proven able to monitor and cripple Al Qaeda presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan as effectively as by military presence.

The preferred approach is for the U.S. to reevaluate its foreign policy and its policy partners. If combating terrorism and Radical Islam are the principal objectives of U.S. foreign policy, then modifying the nature of nations who incite terrorism and cooperating with those nations who are in similar battles will be helpful. Until now, the U.S. has refused to properly engage Saudi Arabia and Israel (two antagonists), both of whom suffer from terrorism, but have internal policies that promote International terrorism and Radical Islam. Saudi Arabia is too fundamentalist and authoritative. Israel's expansionist policies and oppression of the Palestinian people have contributed to the formation of extremist groups and their actions.These nations must consider that their policies have stimulated terrorism and Radical Islam and their policies must be modified.

On the other hand, the U.S. has strained relations with Syria and Lebanon. These nations have had trouble in their northern areas with elements of Radical Islam and need assistance in combating internal terrorism. The U.S. regards Hezbollah and Hamas as terrorist and radical. However, Hezbollah has played a significant role in stabilizing Lebanon and has been responsible in its parliamentary duties. Hamas and Hezbollah are more dedicated to a socio-political Islam rather than a Radical Islam and represent major constituencies. Since their formal formations, neither of these two Islamic organizations nor the previously mentioned Arab nations engaged in any violent acts against the U.S. government, its citizens, and institutions. Some positive interaction with Syria, Lebanon, Hezbollah and Hamas might diminish terrorism, including in Israel, and might deny support for Radical islam. This does not imply that the U.S. approves these governments or the Islamic organizations. It signifies the U.S. recognizes it owes a duty to its own citizens to follow all avenues that can assist in the wars against terrorism and Radical Islam.

Iran, another U.S. adversary, has previously been helpful to the U.S. after the intervention in Afghanistan. Iran contributed funds and materials and was instrumental in forming the present Afghanistan government and in combating the Taliban, an enemy of Iran. Despite its character, The Islamic Republic can play a decisive role in stabilizing Iraq and pacifying much of the Middle East.

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton addressed the Pakistan people with a message: "We stand behind you in your pursuit for peace and stability." They would rather have heard: We regret bringing additional conflict and instability to your nation. We pledge to make amends."

alternativeinsight
November, 2009
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